Zhuangzi 2.6 Heaven and Earth One Finger

以指喻指之非指，不若以非指喻指之非指也；以馬喻馬之非馬，不若以非馬喻馬之非馬也。天地，一指也；萬物，一馬也。可乎可，不可乎不可。道行之而成，物謂之而然。惡乎然？然於然。惡乎不然？不然於不然。物固有所然，物固有所可。無物不然，無物不可。故為是舉莛與楹，厲與西施，恢恑憰怪，道通為一。

Using a finger to illustrate the not-finger-of-the-finger is not as good as using the not-finger to describe the not-finger-of-the-finger. Using a horse to illustrate the not-horse-of-the-horse is not as good as using the not-horse to illustrate the not-horse-of-the-horse.

Heaven and earth, one finger; the ten-thousands things, one horse.

Approving comes from approving; disapproving comes from disapproving.

Walking a path makes it a path. A thing is called-so and it becomes like-so.

How are things made like-so? Like-so from (being called) like-so.

How comes not-like-so? Not-like-so comes from (being called) not-like-so.

All things have a place of "like so." All things have a place of "it may be."

There is no thing without "like so." There is no thing without "it may be."

Therefore by affirmation we can raise up stalks of grass alongside the columns of a hall, a leper alongside Xi Shi, the vast and the precarious, the crafty and the strange, Dao opens (and) makes all one.

喻 to describe something as; an analogy; a simile; a metaphor; an allegory;
可 to approve; can; may
莛 stems; stalks (of grass)
楹 principal columns (or pillars) of a hall
厲 strict, rigorous; stern, severe, grim; violent
西施 (c. 450 BCE) name of a famous beauty of the late Spring and Autumn Period
恢 extensive, vast; to restore
恑 change (precarious?)
憰 wily, time-serving ; to feign;
怪 strange, odd; queer
 

Notes:
喻 I use an active, transitive verb, “illustrate” to capture the process of analogical reasoning (of likening something to something else).

可encompasses both possibility and approval; here Zhuangzi’s point is that it is possible to “approve” or “affirm” anything by virtue of language; all things permit a point of view from which they may be affirmed or “made like so.”

厲 the commentary gives 厉 / 厲 = 病丑人 but contemporary dictionaries list 麻风病/麻風病 as leprosy.

憰 vs 怪 these two terms have additional connotations that resonate with themes in the text.  憰 means crafty or wily, but can also refer to someone who simply “serves-time,” a lazy public servant who simply resides in office serving no benefit to others. The theme of the minor official who only knows enough to execute one function is a recurring theme in Zhuangzi, and correlates with the text’s warnings about conduct “within the world of people.” If we consider this pair as a pair of socio-economic binaries, then 怪 evokes all the cripples, beggars, ex-criminals, and vagrants who exhibit the “sign of virtue complete.” These are more than strange or odd personages, these are social outcasts who flourish despite their status and individual conditions. It seems particularly noteworthy that even these extremes are connected by Dao, and

 

以指喻指之非指 part 1
The usual approach to this phrase is “using a finger to show a finger is not a finger...” In this translation I treat 指之非指 as a compound, “the not-finger-of-the-finger.” I do this to suggest the syntax and a philosophical point. The point in question is: that which is regarded as “something” and that which is “not-something” are mutually, simultaneously entailed by either’s identification. As described in a previous post, the use of any concept to identify or “carve out” an object from the whole of experience (or the Way) creates both “x” and “everything-that-is-not-x.” Ironically, both x and not-x are conceptually connected by trying to distinguish something apart from that which is being used to make the distinction! For further discussions on Daoist logic see Steve Coutinho’s An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies (2014).

以指喻指之非指 part 2
Ziporyn’s explanation of this passage is invaluable. For a full explanation see his extended footnote in his translation of this passage (Ziporyn p. 12, footnote). Here are two key points. First, as Ziporyn points out, Zhuangzi’s passage here is an allusion to Gongsun Long’s argument 無物非指，而指非指 “all things are capable of being pointed out, but pointing out can never be pointed out” (Ziporyn). Second (also from Ziporyn), Zhuangzi’s point here goes beyond Gongsun Long’s argument. Zhuangzi’s point is that “this” is also “that.” Zhuangzi makes this point earlier in the “birth of opposites,” that for every “this” there is a “that,” and for every “that” there is a “this.” As Ziporyn points out, we can see that “this” is also “that” by viewing “this” from the point of view of “that.” Ziporyn translates this as the “Illumination of the Obvious.”

Additional Reading
Coutinho, Steve. An Introduction to Daoist Philosophies. New York: Columbia University Press. 2014.  http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/862077821

Zhuangzi. The Essential Writings: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Translated by Brook Ziporyn. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 2009.

Zhuangzi 2.4 (Part 2) Speaking is not just blowing breath

夫言非吹也。言者有言，其所言者特未定也。果有言邪？其未嘗有言邪？其以為異於鷇音，亦有辯乎，其無辯乎？

道惡乎隱而有真偽？

言惡乎隱而有是非？

道惡乎往而不存？

言惡乎存而不可？

道隱於小成，言隱於榮華。

故有儒、墨之是非，以是其所非，而非其所是。欲是其所非而非其所是，則莫若以明。

Speaking is not just blowing breath. One who speaks has speech, but that which is spoken is especially unfixed. Is the result having speech? Or has one not yet tasted having words? [1] They regard (it) as different from the chirping of little birds, but is there a distinction, or is there no distinction?

Dao: how is it concealed but there is true and false?

Speaking: how is it concealed but there is affirmation and negation?

Dao: how does it go (forth) and not remain? [*]

Speaking: how can it remain and not be? [*]

Dao is obscured in small completions (小成).

Speech is obscured in flowery embellishment.

And so we have the affirmations and negations of the Confucians and the Mohists, affirming what the other negates, and negating what the other affirms. Desiring to affirm what is negated and to negate what is affirmed, this method is not like using clarity.

[1] 存 is associated with depositing and storing up; it can also refer to holding office. This could suggest a pun: “notice how Dao goes out and does not hoard riches like officials holding office.”

[2] 可 is associated with permissibility but usually accompanies a verb. For example《論語：學而》三年無改於父之道，可謂孝矣 “Three years without changing from the path of the father, may be called filial!” In this translation I follow the text and omit a verb. I play 可 against 存 in the same line and the idea of meaning being lost in flowery embellishment: “We keep building up words, but there is nothing here!”

[3] This could be “has yet to experience having speech,” but “has yet to taste words” is too savory to pass up.

特 tè special, unique

嘗cháng taste, try; experience; ever, once

異 yì different; other, another

鷇 kòu fledgling birds

 

隱 yǐn hide, conceal; hidden, secret

真 zhēn real, actual, true, genuine

偽 wěi artificial; deceitful; false, fake

是 shì affirmation

非 fēi negation

往 wǎng go; towards

存 cún exist, live; store up; remain

 

榮 róng glorify, luxuriate; flourishing; honor, glory

華 huá magnificent; splendid; flowery

榮華 rónghuá [plants] blooming, flourishing; glorious, splendid      

 

儒 Rú Confucianism

墨 Mò Mohism

Zhuangzi 2.3 Without "that..." there is no "my..."

Zhuangzi 2.3 Without “that…” there is no “my...” 

非彼無我，非我無所取。是亦近矣，而不知其所為使。若有真宰，而特不得其眹。可行已信，而不見其形，有情而無形。百骸、九竅、六藏，賅而存焉，吾誰與為親？汝皆說之乎？其有私焉？如是皆有，為臣妾乎，其臣妾不足以相治乎。其遞相為君臣乎，其有真君存焉。如求得其情與不得，無益損乎其真。一受其成形，不亡以待盡。與物相刃相靡，其行盡如馳，而莫之能止，不亦悲乎！終身役役而不見其成功，苶然疲役而不知其所歸，可不哀邪！人謂之不死，奚益？其形化，其心與之然，可不謂大哀乎？人之生也，固若是芒乎！其我獨芒，而人亦有不芒者乎！ 

Without "that…" there is no "my…" without "my…" there is nowhere to capture. [1] This draws near, but (I) do not know why it is so. It is as if there is some genuine official, [2] but (I) cannot find their gaze. [3] (I) trust it can carry things out, [4] but (I) cannot see its form; there is feeling but no bodily form. [5] One hundred bones, nine openings, six viscera, [6] completed and collected here, which do I follow and regard intimately? Do you delight in each and every one of them? (Or) do you have secret favorites [7] among them?

If you retain them all, treating (them) as ministers and concubines, those ministers and concubines are incapable of mutual [8] governance. (If) they mutually succeed each other as rulers and ministers, some true ruler must remain. [9] Whether (we) succeed in discovering [10] its nature or not, (this) neither benefits nor harms its actuality. Once receiving their fixed bodily form, (they) do not flee, waiting for the end. In going along with things mutually cutting (disobeying) and mutually dispersing (acquiescing), [12] they proceed to exhaustion as if galloping (away), and nothing can bring them to a halt - is it not sad! [13] In the end the body labors and toils [14] and never sees its success, wearily exhausted in pressed service and does not know how to return, is it not a pity! People say it is not death, (but) where is the benefit? [15] Their human forms [16] dissolve, their minds follow along like so, how can this not be called a great pity? Human life truly is like being covered in ignorance! [17] Or am I alone covered in ignorance, and among the people there is none who is ignorant!

Comments

[1] I am hesitant to translate 我 as "self." I don't think the passage is targeting a general concept of self (at least not directly; See Joachim's "No to no-self in Zhuangzi"). Instead, I think the passage is targeting the making of distinctions, passing judgments, holding views, and attempting to fix these through disputation and conflict. I also hesitate to fill the object of “that…” Legge suggests “view,” which is one correct interpretation, but I think the scope is larger. Any distinction, judgment, or view creates a “that,” and any “that” creates a theoretical point of opposition. This suggests the scope of 彼 could range from disconnected minor points to complex views supported by networks of theory.

[2] Some genuine official who can resolve disputes, see 2.3 (below), 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.11.

[3] 特: 不过; 眹: pupil (ocular); Legge translates this as “we do not find any trace (of his presence and acting). Legge’s translation is valid and is based on the connections between vision, officials, and judgment as “tallying” comparisons: the gaze of the official is the trace of his influence that cannot be found. Zhuangzi will then undercut the role of officials as judging arguments and the simple "tallying" of ideas.

[4] 行: go, walk, travel; circulate; carry out; there is something responsible for the action of the world (Dao), but it cannot be captured in disputation or polar opposition. Rejecting binary opposition removes obfuscations created by trying to "capture" or control a point of dispute.  This draws us closer to the point, but it is difficult to explain because all language involves demonstrative practices, of creating “this” and “that” through discourse.

[5] 竅 the same openings in the pipes of heaven; 藏：脏腑: 心，肝，脾，肺，肾，命门 (source of vitality).

[6] 情feeling, emotion, passion, situation; 形form, shape, appearance.

[7] 说：同情，喜欢，高兴; 私: personal, private; selfish; secret; (opp. 公).

[8] 相: each other; one another; mutually

[9] 遞: v: hand over; pass; give; adv: successively; 存: compare with the discussion on needing a ruler who is not involved in adjudicating (ZZ 2.12); there must be one who is "stored away" who is not involved.

[10] 求得: to look for and obtain.

[11] 相: mutual; consider the mutual generation of opposites: being born through the process of opposition; one's actions being defined only through opposition or acquiescence - the exhaustion stems from actions based on binary opposition.

[12] 刃: edge of a knife: 逆: go against; disobey; defy (opp. 順); 靡: to disperse with the wind: 順: to acquiesce, obey (opp. 逆).

[13] 而莫之能止: reference ZZ 2.1:  the alternating of emotions that do not stop, we do not know from whence they come, and we lead the heart-mind to exhaustion.

[14] 役: forced labor, obligatory task, military service; 苶: weary, tired; lethargic; 然: reading as an adverb suffix; 歸:to return, to go back to, to gather together.

[15] 益: profit, benefit, advantage.

[16] 形: body, thing with form, human body, or appearance.

[17] 芒：愚昧: ignorant; benighted (covered in ignorance). Compare with other images of being overgrown (ZZ 2.2).

Zhuangzi 2.2 Big knowing and small knowing

大知閑閑，小知閒閒；大言炎炎，小言詹詹。其寐也魂交，其覺也形開，與接為構，日以心鬭。縵者，窖者，密者。小恐惴惴，大恐縵縵。其發若機栝，其司是非之謂也；其留如詛盟，其守勝之謂也；其殺如秋冬，以言其日消也；其溺之所為之，不可使復之也；其厭也如緘，以言其老洫也；近死之心，莫使復陽也。喜怒哀樂，慮嘆變慹，姚佚啟態；樂出虛，蒸成菌。日夜相代乎前，而莫知其所萌。已乎已乎！旦暮得此，其所由以生乎！

Big knowing (zhi 知) is bound and idle[1]; Small knowing is partial and incomplete; big speech is hot and rousing; Small speech is verbose and indistinct. When sleeping the spirit wanders, upon waking the body rushes out, meeting and receiving [others] for building schemes, daily using the heart-mind in struggle. There are hesitations, pitfalls, and secrets, [there are] small fears that are apprehensive and worried, [there are] great fears like [endless] sheets of silk. [Everyone makes] pronouncements [flying out] like arrows from a bow, they take charge of naming of right and wrong, they stand their ground as if having sworn an oath; they struggle for victory in speech, and they decline like autumn and winter, and so dwindle like the light of day. [Like] those who have drowned in water, they cannot be ordered to return home; their distastes hold them like binding cords, taking words they (become) (dry overgrown) ditch, their heart-minds approach death and cannot return to the light. (Zhuangzi 2/3/26–29)

[1] 大知閑閑

Legge: “Great knowledge is wide and comprehensive; small knowledge is partial and restricted. Great speech is exact and complete; small speech is (merely) so much talk.”

Watson: “Great understanding is broad and unhurried; little understanding is cramped and busy. Great words are clear and limpid; little words are shrill and quarrelsome.”

Ziporyn: “A large consciousness is idle and spacey” (Ziporyn 2009: 9).

Commentary: 大智广博，小智偏下，大言生气凌人，小言争辩不休。"Great knowledge is broad and extensive; small knowledge is biased and narrow-minded; great speech (exaggeration) is grand and overbearing; small speech is contentious and unceasing."

My Commentary:

My interpretation is unconventional: I pair big knowledge and small knowledge together as both being problematic, in the same way that big speech and small speech are both problematic.

The dilemma is how to interpret 大知閑閑. Watson and Legge both view 大知 positively but try to force a parallel structure with 大言. Before looking at dazhi we can look at dayan.

There are two problems with their translations of 大言炎炎: the first is that the better translation is "great speech is bright and incendiary." This is a more direct translation (fiery) with a stronger series of connotations: n: fire; TCM: internal heat, a cause of disease; n: anger; v: to get angry; adj: fiery, flaming, or popular ("hot"). Legge and Watson treat 火 more like 光 (bright, smooth, polished), but without any reason other than trying to force a positive connotation parallel to their positive translations of 大知.

The second problem is that Zhuangzi is actually quite critical of exaggeration:

First, exaggeration is a further distortion of communication. If language is already an imperfect abstraction, then exaggeration further distorts the relationship between language and ongoing conditions.

Second, exaggeration exacerbates the problems of mistrust. If language is an imperfect conceptualization this is even more so for “great words.” Exaggeration creates aggrandized conceptualizations aimed in a particular direction for a particular effect.

The irony here is that Zhuangzi uses exaggeration to great effect, but that effect is often to draw attention to the shortcomings of language and knowledge (as opposed to applying a concept via shi/fei distinction and then “using” that concept appropriately).

The third problem is that Zhuangzi does not view speech as the source of illumination.  Words function like traps and snares, "capturing" meaning. [*] Once the meaning is found the words are not needed. Words are empty, and only by accepting the emptiness of words can we really understand how to have a word. 

More frequently, words obscure the Way. Words are actually complex schema types that combine distinctions and judgments (and really, all distinctions are judgments). Words "carve up" the world; they create objects (calling a thing makes it so), they create footpaths, and they create fixed systems of understanding.

So, big speech is not clear, limpid, complete, or any other of the adjectives applied; big speech (exaggeration) attempts to overcome the intrinsic uncertainty of knowledge through overstatement; but exaggeration is by nature “unrealistic” and so breeds suspicion, suspicion leads to contention, contention leads to dispute, and so forth.

So: If we reject a positive reading of "big words," this suggests we should also be skeptical of "big knowing." So how should we view 大知? All translations agree that big knowledge or big knowing should be interpreted in a positive manner. I offer a different approach that views 大知 in a critical light, parallel to 大言.

Stay tuned for updates. Currently revising notes for the second part of this commentary, which may form part of a conference paper. 

If you curious in reading an earlier version of this argument in article form, please DM me at: Wandering Clouds (@hingesofdao) / Twitter

Etymology - 阴差阳错 - "Surprising results due to confusing circumstnaces."

Let's talk about 阴差阳错 yīnchāyángcuò (literally "yin lacking yang mistaken," or "surprising results due to confusing circumstances." In contemporary language the phrase conveys the idea of "by happenstance" or "by chance," but the connotation is "through this series of absurd mistakes we have a result that is completely surprising. Think every episode of Arrested Development, or any short-story by O. Henry story (but no movie by M. Night Shyamalan).

他们阴差阳错地烧毁那个香蕉店了

The reason I am interested in this phrase is the presence of yin and yang. Given the massive significance of these concepts in Chinese philosophy, it is simply too interesting to not ask questions about how to look at this phrase through a philosophical lens.

First, are there linguistic considerations in how we approach the phrase? From what I can find this phrase is not a chengyu 成语 (idiom based on a known story), but possibly a guding cizu (a set combination of characters that must appear in a fixed order).

Four-character phrases often (but not always) rely on parallel structure between the first two characters and second two characters: subject/predicate + subject/predicate. In this case, this suggest the pair is 1+2 // 3+4. This gives us: "yin is lacking and yang is mistaken," or "a surprising result due to  confusing circumstances."

The phrase may appear as either 阴差阳错 or 阴错阳差. I think this helps support reading the phrase as a pair of parallel subject-predicate compounds. You could possibly rearrange the characters to create a single subject-predicate statement in the form (1+3) + (2+4), yinyang chacuo. This would mean "yin and yang (circumstances) are in disarray." Yin and yang can be paried together in their common form, yinyang, and chacuo does mean a mistake, mishap, or accident.

However, the general pattern involves a parallel pair of subject-predicate compounds. This is visible in both 阴差阳错 or 阴错阳差. This general pattern and these examples support parsing the passage as 1+2 // 3+4 (parallel compounds).  In this case, a subject (yin) plus a predicate (cha) run parallel to a second subject (yang) and second predicate (cuo). Since the phrase appears as both 1+2 // 3+4 and 1+4 // 3+2, we can look at possible interpretations for both formulations.

Version 1: the nurturing elements of yin are lacking and the organizational powers of yang are misapplied to the situation.

Version 2: the generative powers of yin are disordered and the organizational powers of yang are lacking.

What are the philosophical considerations? Today we associate the idea of yinyang most closely with Daoism, but the term appears throughout Warring States literature. Perhaps most surprisingly the compound yinyang does not appear at all in the the Dao De Jing. Furthermore, the text only contains a single instance of yin and yang separately, Chapter 42.

However, yinyang appears several times in Zhuangzi's Inner Chapters, and throughout the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters.The phrase also appears in other texts, many of which were viewed as part of a shared cultural history in the Zhou Dynasty. In these texts the phrase 阴阳 appear once in the Odes, once in the Book of Documents, and six times in the Yi Jing (Classic of Change). In Confucian texts the term 阴阳 appears most notably Xunzi and the Classic of Rites. The term also appears in Mozi (Mohism), Han Feizi (Legalism), and Sunzi's Art of War (Militarism).

At some later point it would be interesting to trace the development of the terms, or how thye are used in different texts. However, this is a humble blog post, and so I should get about the business of descriving why I think the ideas of yin and yang add interesting context to the phrase, 阴差阳错.

In the Classic of Changes and Ba Gua, yang is creative and yin is receptive. In a general sense yang is heavenly, bright, clear, active, and masculine. Yin is earthly, dark, obscure, receptive, and feminine. Yang is associated with the organizing principles of heaven, which provide the basis of moral action. Yin is associated with with the nurturing receptive capacity of earth, which provides the capacity for growth.

Despite the fact that these concepts appear to be in opposition, the concepts actually indicate two mutually entailed forces that create a process of transformation. Yin and yang are simply the most basic method of describing the process of transformation and change. Systems such as the Yi Jing and Ba Gua make numerous distinctions in the process of change, creating a detailed map of transformation.

These forces are also mutually entailed, meainign the neither exists without the other, and neither functions without the other. Neither is really separate, either, and both should be understood as different aspects of the same system of transformation: every system has elements that be seen as creating forward momentum, and every system has elements that be be seen as receiving, resisting, or moving away. One could look at yang as high states of energy and yin as low states of energy. The high states of energy create change in the system by releasing energy into the system, which moves and transforms the environment. However, in order for the environment to change, it has to have the capacity for change.

Given this, I think 阴差阳错 is really interesting. "Yin lacking and yang mistaken" suggests (first) that the system lacks the basic conditions necessary for effectively completing a process of transformation, and (and second) that the organizing principles are mistaken and incapable of effectively coordinating the system into an effective process of transformation. Imagine the example of an orchestra: in this version, the musicians are poorly trained but playing the correct instruments, while the conductor is well-trained but leading the wrong piece of music.

We can use the same approach for 阴错阳差. In this version "yin mistaken and yang lacking" suggests (first) that the basic conditions are the wrong conditions, and (second) that the organizing principle is poorly constituted or lacking efficacy. In this version, imagine the musicians are well-trained but all playing the wrong instruments. Meanwhile, the conductor is leading the correct score but poorly trained and incapable of keeping time. 

Both versions lead to suprising and confusing results by way of unexpected or haphazard circumstances. In addition there is a sense of moral disarray: the principle agents involved are clearly lacking in either basic ability, or the capacity to correctly apply their abiliteis to a situation. There is a sense that the situation is more than just unexpected, but also undesirable (becaues it could and should be avoided when possible). 

Translation - Zhuangzi - 人間世 - Words are like Wind and Waves

夫言者，風波也；行者，實喪也。風波易以動，實喪易以危。故忿設無由，巧言偏辭。獸死不擇音，氣息茀然，於是並生心厲。剋核大至，則必有不肖之心應之，而不知其然也。苟為不知其然也，孰知其所終！故法言曰：『無遷令，無勸成。』過度，益也。遷令、勸成殆事，美成在久，惡成不及改，可不慎與！且夫乘物以遊心，託不得已以養中，至矣。何作為報也！莫若為致命。此其難者。」

Fū yán zhě, fēng bō yě; xíng zhě, shí sàng yě. Fēng bō yì yǐ dòng, shí sàng yì yǐ wēi. Gù fèn shè wú yóu, qiǎo yán piān cí. Shòu sǐ bù zé yīn, qì xī fú rán, yú shì bìng shēng xīn lì. Kè hé dà zhì, Zé bì yǒu bù xiào xiào zhī xīn yīng zhī, ér bù zhī qí rán yě. Gǒu wéi bù zhī qí rán yě, shú zhī qī suǒ zhōng! Gù fǎ yán yuē: “Wú qiān lìng, wú quán chèng.” Guò dù, yì yě. Qiān lìng, quán chèng dài shì, měi chéng zài jiǔ, è chéng bù jí gǎi, kě bù shèn yǔ! Qiě fù chéng wù yǐ yóu xīn, tuō bù dé yǐ yǐ yàng zhōng, zhì yǐ. Hé zuò wéi bào yě! Mò ruò wéi zhì mìng. Cǐ qí nán zhě.

Rough Translation 
One who speaks, wind and waves; one who walks/carries out actions, wealth/gain and loss; Wind and waves easily taking movement; gain and loss easily taking dangerous/precarious. [In the beginning] anger builds without cause; ingenious/clever words incline/slant speech; dying animals do not pick out tones/pronunciation, spirit stops [and] “like a path overgrown with grass,” in (this same manner) (side-by-side) are born stern/harsh hearts. Subdue the seed/core until big, therefore surely have a heart unlike the one you must have, and you do not know how (it follows). And because not knowing it how it happens, who knows where it will end!

Polished Translation 
In the beginning the Rules of Speech say: "Do not move/shift orders/decrees, do not urge completion." Go by (standard measures/natural system), and benefit; Migrating decrees, advising completion, dangerous affairs, beautiful completion [is at/takes] long time, hateful (dysfunctional) completion does not attain correct, it can be not acting with care! Moreover adjust to things/take advantage of things by a wandering heart, trusting do not grasp at ends, by means of nurturing the center (of things), arrive! What thing works for the sake of reporting/following orders? Nothing is like (doing things) for the sake of delivering orders (obeying fate). Here this is the difficult (thing to do). 

Discussion 
Attempting a direct translation leaves us with: "Subdue the core, until big." We can assume an understood topic, which might leave us with something like: "Subduing the core (of the matter)until anger becomes big, then you certainly have an unsuitable heart." 核 (hé) means "seed" and it can be either literal or figurative. It can be the seed of a fruit or the core of some kind of principled action, such as governing. In either case the image of "something growing and coming to fruition" is the central concept that allows the term to be used figuratively. Pre-Han literature emphasizes the importance of not forcing affairs, instead allowing things to happen in a "natural" manner. The debate in these texts is often about how to best nurture conditions favorable to the natural completion of affairs, or a seemingly effortless consummation of circumstances into the desired conclusion. 

莫若為致命 
Starting with a more literal translation we have "There is nothing (as difficult) as acting for the sake of delivering orders." I highlight the importance of this passage because of the importance of 致 (zhì) and 命 (mìng) as concepts. 命 in particular adds an entire second layer to the passage. The primary layer of meaning in the passage focuses on the difficulty of following orders and ensuring that effective communication occurs between government officials and opposing factions. 命 can mean the literal orders you have received from your commanding officer, which fits well with this layer of meaning. However, 命 can also mean the natural constraints of existence imposed by life, the constraints of the human condition. This second meaning derives from the idea of the orders of 天 We each have to accept the natural constraints imposed on us by the conditions of living. It is this second thing, learning to act within the bounds of our own moral limits, that is most difficult!

Etymology - 地道 - "Authentic"

A speculative Chinese etymology question for anyone who wants to comment:

The modern word 地道 (di dao) is translated as "authentic." The characters 地 (earth) and 道 (way/path) make me wonder if it implies "way of the earth" or something similar.

If this is so, the second question would be which meaning of earth? Would it be the romanticized ideal of pragmatic common folk wisdom? Would it be the idea of earth-works, objects built up and used for dwelling? Or would it be Earth-in-contrast-to-Tian (Sky), and the 道 Way of Earth is to nurture and cultivate things, allowing them to come into realization?

The answer I've found so far suggests none of these. One additional translation of 地道 is "from a place known for the product." This answer is, more than any of the ones suggested above, seems correct. This etymology depends more on understanding the unique and local relations that would have been active in discourse and trade. Relations - knowing where something comes from, knowing its character, and being able to determine whether a product is "genuine" would have been a significant element in Chinese inter-city trade.

The first three answers all suggest Western strategies of analysis: (1) folk-romanticism; (2) some kind of object-oriented pragmatism (as might be found in Heidegger); or (3) a "metaphysical" worldview that appeals to cosmic principle. My suspicion is that the term "authentic" evolved from trading practices, as described in the fourth answer. Understanding relations has always been a key element in understanding Chinese thought, and it makes sense in this context as well.

Talking With Confucius: Chinese Philosophy and Experience

When I first opened the pages to Confucius' analects and read the first paragraphs, I was immediately stricken by how immediate and real Confucius' insights felt. This stood in stark contrast to my encounters with western philosophy. The writings of western philosophy simply reiterated the assumptions and arguments I saw embodied in the problematic social structures and relationships I saw in the world around me. Western philosophy seemed both naïve and paternalistic, and insisted on simplifying problems I thought were more complex or that could be solved by intellectual compromise. Most of all, western philosophy seemed devoid of insights drawn from experience, and my experience felt at odds with large portions of the western tradition.

By comparison Confucius and his disciples seemed to walk off the page and into the world. Their own discussions had an immanence that I never felt in most western thought. Much of this was due to the narrative style. The analects are written as vignettes. They contain much more than simple records of his pronouncements and sayings, although they do this too. They contain descriptions of Master Kong and his students; they contain accounts of his travels and his responses to diplomatic encounters; they contain discussions between sagely exemplars and a cast of students, some adept in the ways of Dao and others struggling for approval. At times we see Confucius talking to his students, and at times we see him standing in reflection of the world around him. But no matter who is talking or what is happening, we engage the philosophy as a set of encounters that draws a shared space between ancient China and the modern reader. The analects were a collection of experiences, and even if entirely fictional they still presented a way to engage the thought being put forward in a way that was immediately engaging.

But this was, I believe, intentional. Writing aphorisms provided models for Confucius' disciples, and presumably for the people who heard the stories. Confucius speaks about the importance of providing sagely examples for the people: a single sage can transform the behavior of an entire community simply by participating in a standard of excellence. By observing deference and ritual propriety the sage does not simply demonstrate - the sage inspires.

This strikes at one of the major differences between eastern and western philosophy - the analects of Confucius seek to change behavior through the power of example and inspiration. The writings of most philosophers in the western cannon seek to change behavior through rational deliberation and argumentative discourse. Argument and discourse certainly have their place and are inherent tools of academic writing. However, they also reflect the western tradition's overriding belief in rationalism, that everything can be understood and controlled through the power of reason alone. While this may be incredibly optimistic it also contains deep flaws. Not only is the human animal not a perfectly rational being, but attempts to dictate all activity through reason end in failure - reason cannot predict all situations, account for all variables, nor make all distinctions. And while reason may be a vital tool to overthrowing oppression it can just as easily become a tool of oppression.

But this is not about the shortcomings of western philosophy. The reason I write this is to explain my appreciation for the vitality of Chinese philosophy. The engagement with experience is at the core of Chinese thought. This is true not only with the analects of Confucius but also the cryptic riddles of the Dao De Jing and the fantastic wanderings of Zhuangzi. It is true for the followers of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi, as well as the Moists and the Legalists. All these schools of thought understood that human activity occurred within a complex world of nature, politics, emotion, and language. They understood that the human desire for harmony occurred in a world of turbulence and change. Their writing reflects this, and it was this engagement with the complexities of experience that drew me into Chinese philosophy.

Philosophy - Zhuangzi and Language

I'm sitting down to write on an article concerning Zhuangzi and language games. This is in response to Hansen's unified theory of language and its consequences for classical Chinese discourse. Hansen's model is a key part of his conclusion that Zhuangzi is a moral relativist, or at best a pluralist, but with no ability to make any discernment that stands as a universal proscription of care.

Classical Chinese philosophy in general seems to assume that people always speak from within positions, or at least, from within contexts. Communication was highly performative (as Fingarette discusses in The Secular as Sacred), and the goal was often the direction or re-direction of human activity.

It might appear at first glance that this observation might nullify much of Hansen's argument - after all, if we're already speaking form within a perspective, doesn't that mean that the issue of relativism doesn't accurately apply? But Hansen's argument is more complicated than this. His claim that Zhuangzi is a relativist is compatible with the idea that language begins as a performative and socially contextualized practice. This is, I assume, encapsulated in his idea that Chinese language functions as a complex set of input and output.

The real challenge is that Hansen seems to regard any use of language as an act of "discrimination," the act of using language to differentiate objects within the world. In classical Chinese we would refer to this as bian 辯, which is closely related to the process of sense discrimination (bian 辨). And any act of discrimination is made from within a perspective, based on the intrinsic constitution of the xin 心 (heat-mind) of the organism in question. So, this means language is a process of socialization and programming, hypothetically infinitely complex in variability, but serving the basic function of differentiating objects and describing the kinds of activity suitable for their interaction and treatment.

Hansen's argument is that Zhuangzi and the Dao De Jing both question the efficacy of this model of language as a means for guiding human behavior. They reject the idea that language can be used as a tool for providing shared standards of discourse. Zhuangzi questions it based on the manner in which every usage of language is made from within a perspective, and that perspective is in part based on the intrinsic dispositions of the agent. These dispositions organize language into a framework of activity, which Hansen claims is dao.

IF we grant all of Hansen's assumptions, this argument does make sense. However, I think we can challenge his model on a few important points.

First, it's not apparent that the only function of language is input-output. Zhuangzi's ability to use language to disrupt closed perspectives suggests that (in Hansen's computer-based model of the heart-mind) language can also be used to "reboot" the heart-mind. Zhuangzi very clearly and emphatically states the importance of clearing out the heart-mind, and allowing spirit (qi 氣) to move through all the organs. This is more than simply communicating another perspective, but seeks to therapeutically treat a function of the heart-mind.

The question is, is this perspective simply another form of input and output? It might be, but if so it would require making a distinction between exchanges that happen internally versus exchanges that happen externally. Hansen wants to avoid "mentalism" in his interpretation, but in doing so he seems to avoid any discussion of the internal mechanisms of the xin. And the text makes several mentions of the difference between internal and external, and of the importance of not allowing the external to enter the body and disrupt the internal. It also suggests the importance of treating the internal as well as the external, because dangers can come from both directions.

We see here that this model actually challenges two important aspects of Hansen's model: the idea that all language is simply input/output, and his model of the heart-mind as simply a collection of dispositions.

I want to develop this critique by demonstrating how Zhuangzi notes several different ways that language can be used. The challenge is to show that these ways of using language do have efficacy across perspectives, and that statements made from one perspective aren't simply attempting to overwrite distinctions made from another perspective. I think this can be shown in the text, as I think that Zhuangzi uses language to remind us of its limits, and that recognizing those limits actually creates the freedom necessary to use language in ways that help promote sorting out the changes of yin and yang.

In other words, it means the purpose Zhuangzi's ethical ideal of nourishing the xin is so the xin can better navigate the fluctuations of yin and yang. This ideal emerges from within Zhuangzi's own perspective, but it also seems important to any agent or organism. If the xin is the factor that determines the subjectivity of the agent, then it seems clear that Zhuangzi's perspective is relevant to any organism or agent that makes discriminations. In this context, it appears beneficial to any organism to engage in the kinds of particular actions described towards the xin, and to learn how to let the xin wander, and facilitate emptiness and wandering.

Philosophy - Language, Desire, and Society

One element I like about east Asian philosophy in general (and here I'm thinking in particular of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism), is the recognition of a complex relationship between language, desire, and social performance.

In the case of the Zhuangzi, the Zhuangzi clearly recognizes how human behavior involves making distinctions that are not initially based in rational reflection. According to the Zhuangzi, men's spirits are constantly trembling, moving in the directions of their desires, and becoming entangled in strife and conflict. Desires actually lead to discriminations, and these discriminations are then unified under a term (an action performed by the heart-mind, which is responsible for "tallying" together the distinctions of the sense-organs). These words then become markers for not only what things are, but how they are useful to the speaker. They function as demonstrative expressions, pointing out something from its environment; as representations (often seen in the ideograms), and finally also as significations of meaning, where meaning is often codified according to how the object is supposed to be used, or how the object functions within a system of relations. These categories agree with Cassirer's distinctions on symbolic form, which provides a useful method for looking at how Chinese language is used.

This does not mean that language is simply emotivistic: rather, it means that language functions in a complex set of relationships, relationships that are in part shaped and understood through language. So, instead of simply saying "tree good!" language *often* (but not always) is used to identify objects and make use of objects within a habituated network of relations. I suspect that further reading in semiotics would help articulate this model more accurately, and I should probably look at the writings of Charles Pierce. In any case, the idea of structure doesn't require that these structures be permanent; but it doesn't mean they simply happen overnight, either. Language, as a complex system of meaning, is a complicated set of relationships that develop over long periods of time, and is passed (or replicated, depending on your view) not only from generation to generation, but from conversation to conversation.

So, where does that leave us? If language isn't simply emotivism, then is it deterministic? Are we doomed to surrender to the network of utility relations as described in words and habituated through living practice and social habits? I should hope not, based simply on the fact that the above theory relies on an unstated assumption: that meaning occurs through usage. And because of this, we are able to identify how we use language, how we use words in individual contexts, and to change. As discussed by the Zhuangzi, words are not simply blowing breath, they have something to say. This is despite the fact that words are not fixed, nor is it always clear what words depend on for their saying anything. However, at least with the Zhuangzi, it seems clear that wordplay, puns, jokes, and unfamiliar uses of language are all part of disrupting established habits of language.

Philosophy - Pragmatism, Language, and Chinese Philosophy

I'm currently working on pragmatic models of language and pragmatic aesthetics of feeling. This is part of my response to Chad Hansen's interpretation of Chinese philosophy, and his arguments concerning the relationship between models of language and models of consciousness.

I'm mostly concerned that Hansen's idea of a "pragmatic" model of language is too simple. He provides a basic model of meaning in a pragmatic model of language, but he doesn't acknowledge that, even in pragmatic models of language, there are many different ways words can be used.

In other words, pragmatic models of language are concerned with more than just meaning as a course of direction. I'm thinking in particular of Wittgenstein and the idea of language games. Under this model, which is a pragmatic model, there can be many different ways of using language. This means there can be different ways of using language to create transformation within an environment.

Hansen describes only one of these methods (in the context of Classical Chinese), the basic use of 明 "ming" to direct human activity. I contend that the Zhuangzi contains depictions of these kinds of basic interactions, but also recognizes several other ways that language can be used. In effect, the Zhuangzi recognizes conventional uses of language, while at the same time proposing its own rules for a new game, a game of therapeutically treating problems caused by the conventional usage. The genius of the Inner Chapters is that the author is capable of shifting between these two games effortlessly, using linguistic strategies of the conventional approach even while deploying new strategies to demonstrate the limitations of those conventions.