Zhuangzi 2.4 (Part 2) Speaking is not just blowing breath

夫言非吹也。言者有言，其所言者特未定也。果有言邪？其未嘗有言邪？其以為異於鷇音，亦有辯乎，其無辯乎？

道惡乎隱而有真偽？

言惡乎隱而有是非？

道惡乎往而不存？

言惡乎存而不可？

道隱於小成，言隱於榮華。

故有儒、墨之是非，以是其所非，而非其所是。欲是其所非而非其所是，則莫若以明。

Speaking is not just blowing breath. One who speaks has speech, but that which is spoken is especially unfixed. Is the result having speech? Or has one not yet tasted having words? [1] They regard (it) as different from the chirping of little birds, but is there a distinction, or is there no distinction?

Dao: how is it concealed but there is true and false?

Speaking: how is it concealed but there is affirmation and negation?

Dao: how does it go (forth) and not remain? [*]

Speaking: how can it remain and not be? [*]

Dao is obscured in small completions (小成).

Speech is obscured in flowery embellishment.

And so we have the affirmations and negations of the Confucians and the Mohists, affirming what the other negates, and negating what the other affirms. Desiring to affirm what is negated and to negate what is affirmed, this method is not like using clarity.

[1] 存 is associated with depositing and storing up; it can also refer to holding office. This could suggest a pun: “notice how Dao goes out and does not hoard riches like officials holding office.”

[2] 可 is associated with permissibility but usually accompanies a verb. For example《論語：學而》三年無改於父之道，可謂孝矣 “Three years without changing from the path of the father, may be called filial!” In this translation I follow the text and omit a verb. I play 可 against 存 in the same line and the idea of meaning being lost in flowery embellishment: “We keep building up words, but there is nothing here!”

[3] This could be “has yet to experience having speech,” but “has yet to taste words” is too savory to pass up.

特 tè special, unique

嘗cháng taste, try; experience; ever, once

異 yì different; other, another

鷇 kòu fledgling birds

 

隱 yǐn hide, conceal; hidden, secret

真 zhēn real, actual, true, genuine

偽 wěi artificial; deceitful; false, fake

是 shì affirmation

非 fēi negation

往 wǎng go; towards

存 cún exist, live; store up; remain

 

榮 róng glorify, luxuriate; flourishing; honor, glory

華 huá magnificent; splendid; flowery

榮華 rónghuá [plants] blooming, flourishing; glorious, splendid      

 

儒 Rú Confucianism

墨 Mò Mohism

Zhuangzi 2.5 This and That

Original

物無非彼，物無非是。

自彼則不見，自知則知之。

故曰：彼出於是，是亦因彼。

彼是，方生之說也。

 

雖然，方生方死，方死方生；

方可方不可，方不可方可；

因是因非，因非因是。

是以聖人不由，而照之于天，亦因是也。

 

是亦彼也，彼亦是也。

彼亦一是非，此亦一是非。

果且有彼是乎哉？

果且無彼是乎哉？

 

彼是莫得其偶，謂之道樞。

樞始得其環中，以應無窮。

是亦一無窮，非亦一無窮也。

故曰「莫若以明」。

 

Translation

There is nothing without “that,” there is nothing without “this.

From the method of “that” (it) is not seen; (only) from the method of knowing (awareness) it is known.

Therefore it is said: “that” emerges from “this,” and “this” depends on “that” (*)

“That” and “this,” it is said they are born together.

 

Even though: together born and passing away, together passing away and being born;

Together admissible and inadmissible, together inadmissible and admissible;

(There is still) “because (this is) right and because (that is) wrong,” or "because (that is) wrong and because (this is) right."

Therefore the sagely person does not use this method, but rather illuminates things together in Heaven, which is also "because of this."

 

“This” is also “that,” and “that” is also “this.”

“That” is merely one “right and wrong,” and “this” is merely one “right and wrong.”

Does (this) result in having “this” and “that?”

Does (this) result in not having “this” and “that?”

 

“That” and “this” have not reached their coincidence, (which) is called the Pivot (Hinge) of Dao.

The hinge is found in the center of circumstances, taking affirmation without exhaustion.

Affirmation without exhaustion, negation without exhaustion.

Thus it is said, (there is) nothing like using clarity!

 

There is Nothing without That/This

As noted recently by one colleague, “the linguistic contradictions of the Qi Wu Lun either delight someone’s heart or give them chills.” I suspect he had this passage in mind. You are free to guess how I feel (which should not be difficult). The key to the passage is that any linguistic distinction (whether this-or-that or this-and-not-this) is an act of conceptual abstraction. Or, any conceptual abstraction is also a linguistic distinction. For Zhuangzi, linguistic distinctions occur within the world, and thus can never fully encapsulate or capture the world.

 

Consider the problem from the earlier question: “how is the way obscured by language?” In Zhuangzi’s view, the world is irreducibly complex. The Way is the totality of complex interdependent relationships that drives all transformation and the experience of change. For Zhuangzi, any attempt to reduce the world to language will be insufficient and partializing. The problem is a problem of demarcation, abstraction, conceptualization, and oversimplification. Every act of linguistic demarcation (this-or-that, (is-the-case, is-not-the-case) is an incomplete abstract conceptualization that creates the possibility of opposition. By virtue of stating “this” we create a “that.” By virtue of identifying anything as “this” we raise the possibility of “not this” or “opposite to this.” This is the “birth of opposites.” The problem is a problem of language, and it is a problem for all language.

 

The Hinges of Dao

The name of this blog and the center of all affirmation and negation. Zhuangzi’s broader point is that disputation reduces discourse to arguments based on limited perspectives and partisan distinctions. When forced to give advice the sage keeps their own views hidden and provides discourse that provides possibilities of transformation. Instead of trying to emerge victorious in disputations about what is or is not, or what should or should not be, the sage provides insights related to what is possible and what could be possible. This moves the goal of the argument from proving-right-versus-wrong to establishing models of possible action that integrate the concerns of all parties involved. Or at least those parties wise enough to listen to sage.

 

Notes

Legge, Watson, and Ziporyn all utilize quotation marks to highlight the role of linguistic denotation in discourse and disputation. I follow their practice here. I think this is warranted due to the frequent use of shi/fei in both content and grammar (structure). The terms are frequently used to preface or mark statements the speaker thinks should be affirmed or negated.

Zhuangzi 2.4 (Part 1) The Fixed Mind

Zhuangzi 2.4, Part 1: “If someone follows the fixed mind…” [1]

夫隨其成心而師之，誰獨且無師乎？奚必知代而心自取者有之？愚者與有焉。未成乎心而有是非，是今日適越而昔至也。是以無有為有。無有為有，雖有神禹，且不能知，吾獨且柰何哉！

If someone follows a fixed-mind and makes it their master, who alone is without a master? [*] Why must (you) understand generation and change and be one whose mind itself selects and chooses (to) have this? A fool can also have (it). [2] Lacking completion in the heart but having affirmations and negations, this is “going to Yue today but arriving yesterday.” It is taking “not having something” and calling it “something.” [3] Having nothing and calling it something, even the Divine Yu cannot understand this. [4] How could I myself endure it! 

師 shī n: teacher, tutor, master; model; v (lit): learn, imitate

成心 chéngxīn n: fixed-mind; adv: intentional; on purpose; deliberate

代 dài v: replace; n: replacements; era, generation

取 qǔ v: take, get, fetch; aim at, seek; adopt, assume, choose

乎 hū similar to 于 in mid-sentence

柰 nài n: crab-apple; v: endure, bear 

[1] There are no passage numbers in the original text. Chinese commentaries and English translations both provide passage numbers, but not always in agreement. After re-reading this passage for this project, I think this discussion on the fixed mind follows more closely with the preceding passage (2.3).

[2] 師 can be a teacher or a master, someone presumably skilled in some art who instructs or guides others. Literary verb usage suggests learning from or imitating an earlier example. This gets at Zhuangzi’s point: if we can regard having a fixed or resolute mind as equivalent to a wise master or teacher, then who doesn’t have a master or teacher? I use the translation “master” to emphasize an unreflective imitation.

[3] 無有為有 wúyǒu wéiyǒu not having something and calling it something; I think it is important to emphasize the linguistic or evaluative aspect of 為 in this context; to look at the absence of something and to regard it the same as having that something.

[4] 神禹 Shén Yǔ the spirit-like Yu; the Great Yu, legendary founder of the Xia Dynasty; tamer of floods.

[*] The modern usage of 成心 refers to intentional, deliberate, or on purpose; “having one’s mind made up,” to act in a certain manner. The mind holds and idea and seeks to act on the idea. In the classical context this might mean a “fixed heart-mind.” The heart-mind “serves” as the “ruler” of the other senses: receiving and evaluating sensory distinctions from the sense organs, and making and evaluating linguistic distinctions in relation to sensory distinctions (including its own emotional and cognitive activity).

As a compound term, 成心 is unique to Zhuangzi in the entirety of pre-Han literature, appearing only in this passage. Zhuangzi’s recognition of the 成心 as a problem is one of the unique aspects of Zhuangzi’s thought. The conflicts that emerge from disputation 辯 of right and wrong (shi/fei) are in part predicated on the cheng-xin, or the inflexibility of thought in the “complete” or fixed-mind.

This is more complicated than simply establishing a position of right and wrong; fixing any linguistic marker obscures the Way. Ordinary usage carves paths through the world establishing linguistic identity (是、彼), establishing proper usage (用) or appropriateness (是、非) and then debating (辯) and holding fast to fixed methods.

This linguistic fixation has important linguistic and ethical consequences, which are explored in other passages through the Inner Chapters. Here are two issues, in brief: (1) the 成心 imposes and holds fixed linguistic terms, obscuring the complex interplay of emerging conditions or possibilities; (2) the 成心 holds fast to binary oppositions, which by their very nature are limited and partisan understandings of complex experience. These fixations prevent the heart-mind from observing the complex fluctuations of experience, the transformations of change, and from responding to emerging conditions.

References/Further Reading:

The Wandering Heart-Mind: Zhuangzi and Moral Psychology in the Inner Chapters | SpringerLink 

Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China - Paperback - Tao Jiang - Oxford University Press (oup.com)

Philosophy - Martyrdom, Texts, and Anonynimity in Moral Philosophy as Political Resistance

Comparisons between philosophical claims and historic political situations are often shunned by standard readings of philosophical texts. We tend to look at philosophy in a vacuum, as if the history of philosophy occurred in a vacuum. Instead of viewing the relationship in unidirectional manner (either thought dictating societal organization or societal structures determining thought), I prefer to think of these in a bidirectional manner –thought and cultural/political conditions are constantly influencing each other – like a bidirectional reaction or an equilibrium.

Consider this comparison between, on the one hand, issues surrounding Socrates death, including his relationship with Alcibiades and the history of Athens, and on the other hand, the ambiguous identity of Laozi, the philosophical claims of the Dao De Jing, the chaos of the Classical Chinese Era. I hope to bring out several themes, in particular the role of philosophy in public discourse, challenging power structures through philosophical analysis, and the real threat from challenging power dynamics with philosophical debate.

Let’s begin with David Johnson's work on Socrates and Alcibiades. Johnson looks at the relationship between Socrates and his on-again-off-again mentorship with Alcibiades, privileged son of Athens. We often interpret the trial of Socrates and his execution by hemlock as a purely philosophical affair, and in our hagiography we praise the incorrigible Gadfly for his steadfast commitment to the pursuit of Wisdom. Johnson tells the story of Alcibiades' disastrous military endeavors in the Peloponnesian War and the consequences this may have had for Socrates' own life. Alcibiades was blamed (not unjustly) for the complete disaster that was the Sicilian Expedition (it was his idea, allegedly). The episode marked a major turning point in the war which ended with Athens’ defeat and subsequent rule under the Thirty Tyrants.

Following Athens’ successful rebellion against  the Spartan proxy government the puppet government was ousted and clemency was granted to all Athenians involved (except the thirty tyrants themselves). But the city’s old democracy was never fully restored – instead we saw the consolidation of power under a newer oligarchy. Johnson argues this may have been part of the reason Socrates was tried for impiety and corruption of the youth as opposed to a more direct charge such as being a traitor. Alcibiades had already been exiled (twice, I believe) and was eventually assassinated in Phrygia. Socrates spent his time publicly critiquing the members of the new government, old war heroes who had seized power. But he did so under the guise of seeking Wisdom – if we are to believe Plato. We should be able to see here that Socrates’ mission may have been more than simply seeking wisdom – he may have actually been publicly challenging members of the new government by trapping them in contradiction and confusion.

So I wonder: to what extent were Plato’s writings an attempt to publicly rewrite the history between Socrates and Alcibiades? Or at least present a narrative where Alcibiades is morally and pedagogically distanced from Socrates: in the Symposium we are shown that Alcibiades neither fully understands Socrates’ position on the Good nor does Socrates support Alcibiades’ erratic dalliances in the realms of flesh and emotion. The message here (in this interpretation) is this: “Of course Socrates knew Alcibiades – everyone knew him! – And yes, they may have engaged in philosophical debate – but surely you can see here that Alcibiades did not understand Socrates’ position on wisdom and The Good, and that Socrates was only interested in trying to educate a young man with great potential. Certainly we can agree that Socrates should not be held responsible for Alcibiades’ flaws and certainly you can see Socrates should not have been executed for questioning the wisdom of the new Athenian order.”

Given the propensity that political leaders have for silencing their dissidents through political trials and purges, does this warrant asking whether or not Laozi ever really existed? While the hegemony of the Qin had not yet arrived, does the ambiguity of Laozi’s identity provide some shielding to his followers? You cannot kill the leader of a movement if that leader doesn’t really exist. You can kill his followers, but it is impossible to silence a leader who cannot be killed (or at least it’s really difficult – hence politically motivated censorship and book burnings).

While not convincing by itself, this line of thought agrees with another hypothesis I like to field about Laozi – that the clear lack of any personal characteristics or discussion of Laozi in the collected sayings of Laozi is both consistent and coherent with the philosophical reasoning of the Dao De Jing. The text proposes that the Confucian emphasis on virtue is problematic, because any attempt to publicly establish one’s virtue simultaneously undermines one’s own attempts to actually be virtuous. Less strongly worded, attempting to lead through imposing ritual and overt displays of virtue leads fails to meet the actual needs of the situation: the people are starving, the lands are overrun with war, and nobody can live in a time of violence.

While I’m not fully convinced – there are some holes here – I certainly think it’s worth exploring the possible philosophical and political reasons we have such difficulty in pinning authorship on the Dao De Jing. The use of anonymity was useful far before the rise of the information and the advent of activism; while a majority position in the classical Chinese world could be seen cultivating safety through establishing one’s name, virtue and group affiliation, the Daoists recognized that the safest position may be having no name at all.

Warp, Weft, and Way - APA Letter on Asian Philosophy

From the excellent Warp, Weft, and Way:
http://warpweftandway.com/2013/10/20/new-apa-newsletter/

APA Newsletters, Fall 2013 (Volume 13, Number 1):
Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

Contents:

1. From the Editor, David H. Kim
2. “Neuroscience, Moral Sentimentalism, and Confucian Philosophy: Moral Psychology of the Body and Emotion,” Bongrae Seok
3. “The Resonant Mind: Daoism and Situated-Embodied Cognition,” Bradley Douglas Park
4. “Self-Making and World-Making: Indian Buddhism and Enactive Philosophy of Mind,” Matthew MacKenzie
5. “Report on APA Central Session: New Orleans, Louisiana,” JeeLoo Liu

These collections of essays touch on a nascent area in comparative studies that holds immense potential for growth and insight. Chinese philosophy has the potential to provide a number of insights to philosophy of mind because Chinese philosophy functions with different root metaphors in their descriptions of experience. Unlike western philosophy, the metaphors and images at the root of Chinese philosophical conceptions of mind already begin with consciousness as an embodied activity. Chinese philosophy doesn't have to extract itself from the vocabulary of Cartesian boxes, black slates, phenomenon vs. noumenon, or any of the ghosts that still haunt western models.