Warp, Weft, and Way - APA Letter on Asian Philosophy

From the excellent Warp, Weft, and Way:
http://warpweftandway.com/2013/10/20/new-apa-newsletter/

APA Newsletters, Fall 2013 (Volume 13, Number 1):
Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

Contents:

1. From the Editor, David H. Kim
2. “Neuroscience, Moral Sentimentalism, and Confucian Philosophy: Moral Psychology of the Body and Emotion,” Bongrae Seok
3. “The Resonant Mind: Daoism and Situated-Embodied Cognition,” Bradley Douglas Park
4. “Self-Making and World-Making: Indian Buddhism and Enactive Philosophy of Mind,” Matthew MacKenzie
5. “Report on APA Central Session: New Orleans, Louisiana,” JeeLoo Liu

These collections of essays touch on a nascent area in comparative studies that holds immense potential for growth and insight. Chinese philosophy has the potential to provide a number of insights to philosophy of mind because Chinese philosophy functions with different root metaphors in their descriptions of experience. Unlike western philosophy, the metaphors and images at the root of Chinese philosophical conceptions of mind already begin with consciousness as an embodied activity. Chinese philosophy doesn't have to extract itself from the vocabulary of Cartesian boxes, black slates, phenomenon vs. noumenon, or any of the ghosts that still haunt western models.

Talking With Confucius: Chinese Philosophy and Experience

When I first opened the pages to Confucius' analects and read the first paragraphs, I was immediately stricken by how immediate and real Confucius' insights felt. This stood in stark contrast to my encounters with western philosophy. The writings of western philosophy simply reiterated the assumptions and arguments I saw embodied in the problematic social structures and relationships I saw in the world around me. Western philosophy seemed both naïve and paternalistic, and insisted on simplifying problems I thought were more complex or that could be solved by intellectual compromise. Most of all, western philosophy seemed devoid of insights drawn from experience, and my experience felt at odds with large portions of the western tradition.

By comparison Confucius and his disciples seemed to walk off the page and into the world. Their own discussions had an immanence that I never felt in most western thought. Much of this was due to the narrative style. The analects are written as vignettes. They contain much more than simple records of his pronouncements and sayings, although they do this too. They contain descriptions of Master Kong and his students; they contain accounts of his travels and his responses to diplomatic encounters; they contain discussions between sagely exemplars and a cast of students, some adept in the ways of Dao and others struggling for approval. At times we see Confucius talking to his students, and at times we see him standing in reflection of the world around him. But no matter who is talking or what is happening, we engage the philosophy as a set of encounters that draws a shared space between ancient China and the modern reader. The analects were a collection of experiences, and even if entirely fictional they still presented a way to engage the thought being put forward in a way that was immediately engaging.

But this was, I believe, intentional. Writing aphorisms provided models for Confucius' disciples, and presumably for the people who heard the stories. Confucius speaks about the importance of providing sagely examples for the people: a single sage can transform the behavior of an entire community simply by participating in a standard of excellence. By observing deference and ritual propriety the sage does not simply demonstrate - the sage inspires.

This strikes at one of the major differences between eastern and western philosophy - the analects of Confucius seek to change behavior through the power of example and inspiration. The writings of most philosophers in the western cannon seek to change behavior through rational deliberation and argumentative discourse. Argument and discourse certainly have their place and are inherent tools of academic writing. However, they also reflect the western tradition's overriding belief in rationalism, that everything can be understood and controlled through the power of reason alone. While this may be incredibly optimistic it also contains deep flaws. Not only is the human animal not a perfectly rational being, but attempts to dictate all activity through reason end in failure - reason cannot predict all situations, account for all variables, nor make all distinctions. And while reason may be a vital tool to overthrowing oppression it can just as easily become a tool of oppression.

But this is not about the shortcomings of western philosophy. The reason I write this is to explain my appreciation for the vitality of Chinese philosophy. The engagement with experience is at the core of Chinese thought. This is true not only with the analects of Confucius but also the cryptic riddles of the Dao De Jing and the fantastic wanderings of Zhuangzi. It is true for the followers of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi, as well as the Moists and the Legalists. All these schools of thought understood that human activity occurred within a complex world of nature, politics, emotion, and language. They understood that the human desire for harmony occurred in a world of turbulence and change. Their writing reflects this, and it was this engagement with the complexities of experience that drew me into Chinese philosophy.

Academia - On East Asian Studies

This is a question that was raised in a series of email dialogues with a few friends. One in particular is concerned about the role of Asian philosophy in the American philosophical market (a concern I share as well), and about his ability to get a job as philosopher of Japanese aesthetics and religion. He's actually studying the influence of Non-Japanese religious and philosophical concepts on the Japanese idea of mono-no-aware, an idea that is interesting, controversial, and that should provide plenty of scholarly depth and research.

The problem, however, is that in terms of marketability, he would probably be better suited in an East Asian Languages and Culture program. I've encouraged him to apply, and I hope something works out for him. Given that things might not, this naturally raised questions and concerns about the nature of the American academic market, whether contemporary American philosophy has any use or interest for Asian philosophy in general, and (for me, at least), the degree to which the two can engage in functionally productive conversations on shared topics of interest.

First of all, one of the immediate problems in studying Asian philosophy is that the American academic market isn't even convinced that Chinese and Japanese traditions produce something called "philosophy." The evidence here isn't simply anecdotal: there's no standard understanding of how eastern traditions fit into the administrative structures higher education. The number of programs that actually allow for the study of east Asian philosophy qua philosophy is relatively small.

Both East Asian and South Asian philosophy have traditionally found their homes in religious studies programs, departments of religion, or departments of east asian religions and language. These latter are in all honesty probably provide the strongest opportunities for studying eastern thought, as it requires understanding different modes of discourse, different cosmologies, and usually at least two other languages (Chinese and Japanese for East Asian, and German and Sanskrit for South Asian).

However, this also seems to have the effect of keeping contemporary American philosophy removed from the concerns of eastern thought. Religious beliefs about ancient cosmologies, after all, are not really the concern of contemporary philosophy. As such, contemporary American philosophy (philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, etc) can thus safely disregard the ideas and beliefs of eastern traditions.

On a more practical level, attempting to move beyond simple comparative philosophy is actually an extremely difficult task. Introducing an entirely new vocabulary to a conversation already in progress is not only disorienting to the original members of the conversation, but is often viewed as anti-productive and self-serving. The other problem is that the concepts in many eastern traditions are based on views of personhood and language that are so fundamentally different from the models already in use in many western debates that attempting to use eastern terms often results in being bogged down in lengthy discussions about cosmology, moral relativism, and incommensurability.

This wouldn't be such a frustrating issue to me if I didn't feel like Asian traditions actually have a great deal to say to western traditions. The recent development of moral psychology could benefit immensely from dialogues with Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. Political and social philosophy is another area of immense importance, as eastern traditions don't just grapple with problems of intersubjectivity, but are all predicated on assumptions of intersubjectivity. The resultant models of personhood found in asian traditions of thought are simultaneously nuanced and complex, and further study by western traditions in general would reveal many insights and resolve many issues still under struggle. Models of aesthetics as well would benefit, as Eastern thought in particular eschews subject/object relations in art and instead focuses on the dynamics of aesthetic experience and the transformative power of gesture or word.

This is just a small list of the possible benefits, and I think it's worth stopping here for the moment. One direct for further conversation would be to discuss these particular areas in more detail, and provide more specific examples. Another direction for further discussion would be to discuss more complicated areas, such as philosophy of science and technology. And finally, I still want to eventually address my ultimate concern, which is the nature of incommensurability and the challenges of actually engaging in cross-cultural philosophical dialogue.

Here's a spoiler: the biggest problem is often identifying a shared problem, and convincing all the interlocutors involved that the problem is common across different traditions.

Philosophy - Pragmatism, Language, and Chinese Philosophy

I'm currently working on pragmatic models of language and pragmatic aesthetics of feeling. This is part of my response to Chad Hansen's interpretation of Chinese philosophy, and his arguments concerning the relationship between models of language and models of consciousness.

I'm mostly concerned that Hansen's idea of a "pragmatic" model of language is too simple. He provides a basic model of meaning in a pragmatic model of language, but he doesn't acknowledge that, even in pragmatic models of language, there are many different ways words can be used.

In other words, pragmatic models of language are concerned with more than just meaning as a course of direction. I'm thinking in particular of Wittgenstein and the idea of language games. Under this model, which is a pragmatic model, there can be many different ways of using language. This means there can be different ways of using language to create transformation within an environment.

Hansen describes only one of these methods (in the context of Classical Chinese), the basic use of 明 "ming" to direct human activity. I contend that the Zhuangzi contains depictions of these kinds of basic interactions, but also recognizes several other ways that language can be used. In effect, the Zhuangzi recognizes conventional uses of language, while at the same time proposing its own rules for a new game, a game of therapeutically treating problems caused by the conventional usage. The genius of the Inner Chapters is that the author is capable of shifting between these two games effortlessly, using linguistic strategies of the conventional approach even while deploying new strategies to demonstrate the limitations of those conventions.