Philosophy - Language, Desire, and Society

One element I like about east Asian philosophy in general (and here I'm thinking in particular of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism), is the recognition of a complex relationship between language, desire, and social performance.

In the case of the Zhuangzi, the Zhuangzi clearly recognizes how human behavior involves making distinctions that are not initially based in rational reflection. According to the Zhuangzi, men's spirits are constantly trembling, moving in the directions of their desires, and becoming entangled in strife and conflict. Desires actually lead to discriminations, and these discriminations are then unified under a term (an action performed by the heart-mind, which is responsible for "tallying" together the distinctions of the sense-organs). These words then become markers for not only what things are, but how they are useful to the speaker. They function as demonstrative expressions, pointing out something from its environment; as representations (often seen in the ideograms), and finally also as significations of meaning, where meaning is often codified according to how the object is supposed to be used, or how the object functions within a system of relations. These categories agree with Cassirer's distinctions on symbolic form, which provides a useful method for looking at how Chinese language is used.

This does not mean that language is simply emotivistic: rather, it means that language functions in a complex set of relationships, relationships that are in part shaped and understood through language. So, instead of simply saying "tree good!" language *often* (but not always) is used to identify objects and make use of objects within a habituated network of relations. I suspect that further reading in semiotics would help articulate this model more accurately, and I should probably look at the writings of Charles Pierce. In any case, the idea of structure doesn't require that these structures be permanent; but it doesn't mean they simply happen overnight, either. Language, as a complex system of meaning, is a complicated set of relationships that develop over long periods of time, and is passed (or replicated, depending on your view) not only from generation to generation, but from conversation to conversation.

So, where does that leave us? If language isn't simply emotivism, then is it deterministic? Are we doomed to surrender to the network of utility relations as described in words and habituated through living practice and social habits? I should hope not, based simply on the fact that the above theory relies on an unstated assumption: that meaning occurs through usage. And because of this, we are able to identify how we use language, how we use words in individual contexts, and to change. As discussed by the Zhuangzi, words are not simply blowing breath, they have something to say. This is despite the fact that words are not fixed, nor is it always clear what words depend on for their saying anything. However, at least with the Zhuangzi, it seems clear that wordplay, puns, jokes, and unfamiliar uses of language are all part of disrupting established habits of language.

Philosophy - Pragmatism, Language, and Chinese Philosophy

I'm currently working on pragmatic models of language and pragmatic aesthetics of feeling. This is part of my response to Chad Hansen's interpretation of Chinese philosophy, and his arguments concerning the relationship between models of language and models of consciousness.

I'm mostly concerned that Hansen's idea of a "pragmatic" model of language is too simple. He provides a basic model of meaning in a pragmatic model of language, but he doesn't acknowledge that, even in pragmatic models of language, there are many different ways words can be used.

In other words, pragmatic models of language are concerned with more than just meaning as a course of direction. I'm thinking in particular of Wittgenstein and the idea of language games. Under this model, which is a pragmatic model, there can be many different ways of using language. This means there can be different ways of using language to create transformation within an environment.

Hansen describes only one of these methods (in the context of Classical Chinese), the basic use of 明 "ming" to direct human activity. I contend that the Zhuangzi contains depictions of these kinds of basic interactions, but also recognizes several other ways that language can be used. In effect, the Zhuangzi recognizes conventional uses of language, while at the same time proposing its own rules for a new game, a game of therapeutically treating problems caused by the conventional usage. The genius of the Inner Chapters is that the author is capable of shifting between these two games effortlessly, using linguistic strategies of the conventional approach even while deploying new strategies to demonstrate the limitations of those conventions.