In the following posts in this series I'm going to articulate some particular issues related to my views on aesthetic experience. There are two questions we have to address. The first question is what we mean when we say that aesthetic experience is primary. I've already been talking about this the preceding part to this post, where I mentioned some of the influences on my thought and why aesthetic experience does not devolve to mere Emotivism.
The second question is easy to ask but difficult to answer: what are the mechanics of an aesthetic theory of experience? This simple question leads to a variety of other more complex questions, such as: Which parts of experience are we talking about? How do these parts relate? What is the relation between experience and "reality?" Ultimately, all these questions push us in the direction of asking about the relationship between experience and meaning.
This also points to my ultimate goal with an aesthetic theory of experience. Ultimately I argue for the value of moral psychology. Most philosophies, political systems, religious systems, or other traditions of thought have their own way of looking at the world. This is not controversial. However, what is less accepted is that each of these has ways to engage experience that allows for therapeutic treatment and restoration of a humanitarian orientation. That's my goal, right there - to argue that aesthetic experience provides the conditions for therapeutic moral psychology in many different traditions.
