Translation - Zhuangzi - 人間世 - Words are like Wind and Waves

夫言者，風波也；行者，實喪也。風波易以動，實喪易以危。故忿設無由，巧言偏辭。獸死不擇音，氣息茀然，於是並生心厲。剋核大至，則必有不肖之心應之，而不知其然也。苟為不知其然也，孰知其所終！故法言曰：『無遷令，無勸成。』過度，益也。遷令、勸成殆事，美成在久，惡成不及改，可不慎與！且夫乘物以遊心，託不得已以養中，至矣。何作為報也！莫若為致命。此其難者。」

Fū yán zhě, fēng bō yě; xíng zhě, shí sàng yě. Fēng bō yì yǐ dòng, shí sàng yì yǐ wēi. Gù fèn shè wú yóu, qiǎo yán piān cí. Shòu sǐ bù zé yīn, qì xī fú rán, yú shì bìng shēng xīn lì. Kè hé dà zhì, Zé bì yǒu bù xiào xiào zhī xīn yīng zhī, ér bù zhī qí rán yě. Gǒu wéi bù zhī qí rán yě, shú zhī qī suǒ zhōng! Gù fǎ yán yuē: “Wú qiān lìng, wú quán chèng.” Guò dù, yì yě. Qiān lìng, quán chèng dài shì, měi chéng zài jiǔ, è chéng bù jí gǎi, kě bù shèn yǔ! Qiě fù chéng wù yǐ yóu xīn, tuō bù dé yǐ yǐ yàng zhōng, zhì yǐ. Hé zuò wéi bào yě! Mò ruò wéi zhì mìng. Cǐ qí nán zhě.

Rough Translation 
One who speaks, wind and waves; one who walks/carries out actions, wealth/gain and loss; Wind and waves easily taking movement; gain and loss easily taking dangerous/precarious. [In the beginning] anger builds without cause; ingenious/clever words incline/slant speech; dying animals do not pick out tones/pronunciation, spirit stops [and] “like a path overgrown with grass,” in (this same manner) (side-by-side) are born stern/harsh hearts. Subdue the seed/core until big, therefore surely have a heart unlike the one you must have, and you do not know how (it follows). And because not knowing it how it happens, who knows where it will end!

Polished Translation 
In the beginning the Rules of Speech say: "Do not move/shift orders/decrees, do not urge completion." Go by (standard measures/natural system), and benefit; Migrating decrees, advising completion, dangerous affairs, beautiful completion [is at/takes] long time, hateful (dysfunctional) completion does not attain correct, it can be not acting with care! Moreover adjust to things/take advantage of things by a wandering heart, trusting do not grasp at ends, by means of nurturing the center (of things), arrive! What thing works for the sake of reporting/following orders? Nothing is like (doing things) for the sake of delivering orders (obeying fate). Here this is the difficult (thing to do). 

Discussion 
Attempting a direct translation leaves us with: "Subdue the core, until big." We can assume an understood topic, which might leave us with something like: "Subduing the core (of the matter)until anger becomes big, then you certainly have an unsuitable heart." 核 (hé) means "seed" and it can be either literal or figurative. It can be the seed of a fruit or the core of some kind of principled action, such as governing. In either case the image of "something growing and coming to fruition" is the central concept that allows the term to be used figuratively. Pre-Han literature emphasizes the importance of not forcing affairs, instead allowing things to happen in a "natural" manner. The debate in these texts is often about how to best nurture conditions favorable to the natural completion of affairs, or a seemingly effortless consummation of circumstances into the desired conclusion. 

莫若為致命 
Starting with a more literal translation we have "There is nothing (as difficult) as acting for the sake of delivering orders." I highlight the importance of this passage because of the importance of 致 (zhì) and 命 (mìng) as concepts. 命 in particular adds an entire second layer to the passage. The primary layer of meaning in the passage focuses on the difficulty of following orders and ensuring that effective communication occurs between government officials and opposing factions. 命 can mean the literal orders you have received from your commanding officer, which fits well with this layer of meaning. However, 命 can also mean the natural constraints of existence imposed by life, the constraints of the human condition. This second meaning derives from the idea of the orders of 天 We each have to accept the natural constraints imposed on us by the conditions of living. It is this second thing, learning to act within the bounds of our own moral limits, that is most difficult!

Philosophy - Martyrdom, Texts, and Anonynimity in Moral Philosophy as Political Resistance

Comparisons between philosophical claims and historic political situations are often shunned by standard readings of philosophical texts. We tend to look at philosophy in a vacuum, as if the history of philosophy occurred in a vacuum. Instead of viewing the relationship in unidirectional manner (either thought dictating societal organization or societal structures determining thought), I prefer to think of these in a bidirectional manner –thought and cultural/political conditions are constantly influencing each other – like a bidirectional reaction or an equilibrium.

Consider this comparison between, on the one hand, issues surrounding Socrates death, including his relationship with Alcibiades and the history of Athens, and on the other hand, the ambiguous identity of Laozi, the philosophical claims of the Dao De Jing, the chaos of the Classical Chinese Era. I hope to bring out several themes, in particular the role of philosophy in public discourse, challenging power structures through philosophical analysis, and the real threat from challenging power dynamics with philosophical debate.

Let’s begin with David Johnson's work on Socrates and Alcibiades. Johnson looks at the relationship between Socrates and his on-again-off-again mentorship with Alcibiades, privileged son of Athens. We often interpret the trial of Socrates and his execution by hemlock as a purely philosophical affair, and in our hagiography we praise the incorrigible Gadfly for his steadfast commitment to the pursuit of Wisdom. Johnson tells the story of Alcibiades' disastrous military endeavors in the Peloponnesian War and the consequences this may have had for Socrates' own life. Alcibiades was blamed (not unjustly) for the complete disaster that was the Sicilian Expedition (it was his idea, allegedly). The episode marked a major turning point in the war which ended with Athens’ defeat and subsequent rule under the Thirty Tyrants.

Following Athens’ successful rebellion against  the Spartan proxy government the puppet government was ousted and clemency was granted to all Athenians involved (except the thirty tyrants themselves). But the city’s old democracy was never fully restored – instead we saw the consolidation of power under a newer oligarchy. Johnson argues this may have been part of the reason Socrates was tried for impiety and corruption of the youth as opposed to a more direct charge such as being a traitor. Alcibiades had already been exiled (twice, I believe) and was eventually assassinated in Phrygia. Socrates spent his time publicly critiquing the members of the new government, old war heroes who had seized power. But he did so under the guise of seeking Wisdom – if we are to believe Plato. We should be able to see here that Socrates’ mission may have been more than simply seeking wisdom – he may have actually been publicly challenging members of the new government by trapping them in contradiction and confusion.

So I wonder: to what extent were Plato’s writings an attempt to publicly rewrite the history between Socrates and Alcibiades? Or at least present a narrative where Alcibiades is morally and pedagogically distanced from Socrates: in the Symposium we are shown that Alcibiades neither fully understands Socrates’ position on the Good nor does Socrates support Alcibiades’ erratic dalliances in the realms of flesh and emotion. The message here (in this interpretation) is this: “Of course Socrates knew Alcibiades – everyone knew him! – And yes, they may have engaged in philosophical debate – but surely you can see here that Alcibiades did not understand Socrates’ position on wisdom and The Good, and that Socrates was only interested in trying to educate a young man with great potential. Certainly we can agree that Socrates should not be held responsible for Alcibiades’ flaws and certainly you can see Socrates should not have been executed for questioning the wisdom of the new Athenian order.”

Given the propensity that political leaders have for silencing their dissidents through political trials and purges, does this warrant asking whether or not Laozi ever really existed? While the hegemony of the Qin had not yet arrived, does the ambiguity of Laozi’s identity provide some shielding to his followers? You cannot kill the leader of a movement if that leader doesn’t really exist. You can kill his followers, but it is impossible to silence a leader who cannot be killed (or at least it’s really difficult – hence politically motivated censorship and book burnings).

While not convincing by itself, this line of thought agrees with another hypothesis I like to field about Laozi – that the clear lack of any personal characteristics or discussion of Laozi in the collected sayings of Laozi is both consistent and coherent with the philosophical reasoning of the Dao De Jing. The text proposes that the Confucian emphasis on virtue is problematic, because any attempt to publicly establish one’s virtue simultaneously undermines one’s own attempts to actually be virtuous. Less strongly worded, attempting to lead through imposing ritual and overt displays of virtue leads fails to meet the actual needs of the situation: the people are starving, the lands are overrun with war, and nobody can live in a time of violence.

While I’m not fully convinced – there are some holes here – I certainly think it’s worth exploring the possible philosophical and political reasons we have such difficulty in pinning authorship on the Dao De Jing. The use of anonymity was useful far before the rise of the information and the advent of activism; while a majority position in the classical Chinese world could be seen cultivating safety through establishing one’s name, virtue and group affiliation, the Daoists recognized that the safest position may be having no name at all.