Philosophy - Zhuangzi and Language

I'm sitting down to write on an article concerning Zhuangzi and language games. This is in response to Hansen's unified theory of language and its consequences for classical Chinese discourse. Hansen's model is a key part of his conclusion that Zhuangzi is a moral relativist, or at best a pluralist, but with no ability to make any discernment that stands as a universal proscription of care.

Classical Chinese philosophy in general seems to assume that people always speak from within positions, or at least, from within contexts. Communication was highly performative (as Fingarette discusses in The Secular as Sacred), and the goal was often the direction or re-direction of human activity.

It might appear at first glance that this observation might nullify much of Hansen's argument - after all, if we're already speaking form within a perspective, doesn't that mean that the issue of relativism doesn't accurately apply? But Hansen's argument is more complicated than this. His claim that Zhuangzi is a relativist is compatible with the idea that language begins as a performative and socially contextualized practice. This is, I assume, encapsulated in his idea that Chinese language functions as a complex set of input and output.

The real challenge is that Hansen seems to regard any use of language as an act of "discrimination," the act of using language to differentiate objects within the world. In classical Chinese we would refer to this as bian 辯, which is closely related to the process of sense discrimination (bian 辨). And any act of discrimination is made from within a perspective, based on the intrinsic constitution of the xin 心 (heat-mind) of the organism in question. So, this means language is a process of socialization and programming, hypothetically infinitely complex in variability, but serving the basic function of differentiating objects and describing the kinds of activity suitable for their interaction and treatment.

Hansen's argument is that Zhuangzi and the Dao De Jing both question the efficacy of this model of language as a means for guiding human behavior. They reject the idea that language can be used as a tool for providing shared standards of discourse. Zhuangzi questions it based on the manner in which every usage of language is made from within a perspective, and that perspective is in part based on the intrinsic dispositions of the agent. These dispositions organize language into a framework of activity, which Hansen claims is dao.

IF we grant all of Hansen's assumptions, this argument does make sense. However, I think we can challenge his model on a few important points.

First, it's not apparent that the only function of language is input-output. Zhuangzi's ability to use language to disrupt closed perspectives suggests that (in Hansen's computer-based model of the heart-mind) language can also be used to "reboot" the heart-mind. Zhuangzi very clearly and emphatically states the importance of clearing out the heart-mind, and allowing spirit (qi 氣) to move through all the organs. This is more than simply communicating another perspective, but seeks to therapeutically treat a function of the heart-mind.

The question is, is this perspective simply another form of input and output? It might be, but if so it would require making a distinction between exchanges that happen internally versus exchanges that happen externally. Hansen wants to avoid "mentalism" in his interpretation, but in doing so he seems to avoid any discussion of the internal mechanisms of the xin. And the text makes several mentions of the difference between internal and external, and of the importance of not allowing the external to enter the body and disrupt the internal. It also suggests the importance of treating the internal as well as the external, because dangers can come from both directions.

We see here that this model actually challenges two important aspects of Hansen's model: the idea that all language is simply input/output, and his model of the heart-mind as simply a collection of dispositions.

I want to develop this critique by demonstrating how Zhuangzi notes several different ways that language can be used. The challenge is to show that these ways of using language do have efficacy across perspectives, and that statements made from one perspective aren't simply attempting to overwrite distinctions made from another perspective. I think this can be shown in the text, as I think that Zhuangzi uses language to remind us of its limits, and that recognizing those limits actually creates the freedom necessary to use language in ways that help promote sorting out the changes of yin and yang.

In other words, it means the purpose Zhuangzi's ethical ideal of nourishing the xin is so the xin can better navigate the fluctuations of yin and yang. This ideal emerges from within Zhuangzi's own perspective, but it also seems important to any agent or organism. If the xin is the factor that determines the subjectivity of the agent, then it seems clear that Zhuangzi's perspective is relevant to any organism or agent that makes discriminations. In this context, it appears beneficial to any organism to engage in the kinds of particular actions described towards the xin, and to learn how to let the xin wander, and facilitate emptiness and wandering.