Comparisons between philosophical claims and historic political situations are often shunned by standard readings of philosophical texts. We tend to look at philosophy in a vacuum, as if the history of philosophy occurred in a vacuum. Instead of viewing the relationship in unidirectional manner (either thought dictating societal organization or societal structures determining thought), I prefer to think of these in a bidirectional manner –thought and cultural/political conditions are constantly influencing each other – like a bidirectional reaction or an equilibrium.
Consider this comparison between, on the one hand, issues surrounding Socrates death, including his relationship with Alcibiades and the history of Athens, and on the other hand, the ambiguous identity of Laozi, the philosophical claims of the Dao De Jing, the chaos of the Classical Chinese Era. I hope to bring out several themes, in particular the role of philosophy in public discourse, challenging power structures through philosophical
analysis, and the real threat from challenging power dynamics with philosophical debate.
Let’s begin with David Johnson's work on Socrates and Alcibiades. Johnson looks at the relationship between Socrates and his on-again-off-again mentorship with Alcibiades, privileged son of Athens. We often interpret the trial of Socrates and his execution by hemlock as a purely philosophical affair, and in our hagiography we praise the incorrigible Gadfly for his steadfast commitment to the pursuit of Wisdom.
Johnson tells the story of Alcibiades' disastrous military endeavors in the Peloponnesian War and the consequences this may have had for Socrates' own life. Alcibiades was blamed (not unjustly) for the complete disaster that was the Sicilian Expedition (it was his idea, allegedly). The episode marked a major turning point in the war which ended with Athens’ defeat and subsequent rule under the Thirty Tyrants.
Following Athens’ successful rebellion against the Spartan proxy government the puppet government was ousted and clemency was granted to all Athenians involved (except the thirty tyrants themselves). But the city’s old democracy was never fully restored – instead we saw the consolidation of power under a newer oligarchy.
Johnson argues this may have been part of the reason Socrates was tried for impiety and corruption of the youth as opposed to a more direct charge such as being a traitor. Alcibiades had already been exiled (twice, I believe) and was eventually assassinated in Phrygia. Socrates spent his time publicly critiquing the members of the new government, old war heroes who had seized power. But he did so under the guise of seeking Wisdom – if we are to believe Plato. We should be able to see here that Socrates’ mission may have been more than simply seeking wisdom – he may have actually been publicly challenging members of the new government by trapping them in contradiction and confusion.
So I wonder: to what extent were
Plato’s writings an attempt to publicly rewrite the history between Socrates
and Alcibiades? Or at least present a narrative where Alcibiades is morally and
pedagogically distanced from Socrates: in the Symposium we are shown that
Alcibiades neither fully understands Socrates’ position on the Good nor does
Socrates support Alcibiades’ erratic dalliances in the realms of flesh and
emotion.
The message here (in this interpretation) is this: “Of course Socrates knew Alcibiades – everyone knew
him! – And yes, they may have engaged in philosophical debate – but surely you
can see here that Alcibiades did not understand Socrates’ position on wisdom and
The Good, and that Socrates was only interested in trying to educate a young
man with great potential. Certainly we can agree that Socrates should not be
held responsible for Alcibiades’ flaws and certainly you can see Socrates
should not have been executed for questioning the wisdom of the new Athenian
order.”
Given the propensity that political leaders have for silencing
their dissidents through political trials and purges, does this warrant asking
whether or not Laozi ever really existed? While the hegemony of the Qin had not
yet arrived, does the ambiguity of Laozi’s identity provide some shielding to
his followers? You cannot kill the leader of a movement if that leader doesn’t
really exist. You can kill his followers, but it is impossible to silence a
leader who cannot be killed (or at least it’s really difficult – hence
politically motivated censorship and book burnings).
While not convincing by itself, this line of thought agrees with
another hypothesis I like to field about Laozi – that the clear lack of any
personal characteristics or discussion of Laozi in the collected sayings of
Laozi is both consistent and coherent with the philosophical reasoning of the
Dao De Jing. The text proposes that the Confucian emphasis on virtue is
problematic, because any attempt to publicly establish one’s virtue
simultaneously undermines one’s own attempts to actually be virtuous. Less
strongly worded, attempting to lead through imposing ritual and
overt displays of
virtue leads fails to meet the actual needs of the situation: the people
are starving, the lands are overrun with war, and nobody can live in a time of
violence.
While I’m not fully convinced – there are some holes here – I
certainly think it’s worth exploring the possible philosophical and political
reasons we have such difficulty in pinning authorship on the Dao De Jing. The
use of anonymity was useful far before the rise of the information and the
advent of activism; while a majority position in the classical Chinese world
could be seen cultivating safety through establishing one’s name, virtue and
group affiliation, the Daoists recognized that the safest position may be
having no name at all.
