Zǐ Yóu wèn
xiào. Zǐ yuē, "Jīn zhī xiào zhě, shì wèi néng yǎng. Zhì yú quǎn mǎ, jiē
néng yǒu yǎng; bù jìng, hé yǐ bié hū?"
Zi You
asked (about) being filial. The Master said, "Those who are filial today,
are called so because (they) can nourish (the elderly). As for dogs and horses,
anyone can be nourishing. (This is) not enough - what is the difference
(between us and them)?
Zi You
asked (about) being filial. The Master said, "Those who are filial today,
they are called so because they can nourish the elderly. But if we extend this
to dogs and horses, then anyone can be called nourishing. This is not enough!
How can we distinguish ourselves?
至於 zhì yú = as far as (up to + in this
location)
何以 hé yǐ = why/how (by what means)
The
use of 養 is interesting. In modern Chinese the term is usually
reserved for raising children or animals; the idea is one of providing care to
living beings who require care. I tend to connect 養
to a sense of nourishing life. Confucius' answer cleverly does not actually
answer what it means to be filial, but his answer implies that being filial
both (1) involves caring for the vulnerable and weak; and (2) that those who
are regarded as filial today simply provide food. But for Confucius, simply
providing food is not enough. How do we distinguish caring for the elderly from
caring for dogs and horses? The answer doesn't appear in this passage, but it
does appear in the next passage (2.8): the issue is the countenance. This is
previewed in 1.7, where the virtuous exert themselves for others (note: the
commentaries appear to disagree on the meaning of 賢賢易色,
but the putting forth of effort is clear).
We might
discuss the relation of this to performance, but in English the term often
performance implies a non-integral addition. For the Confucian project,
however, one's emotional expression is an intimate
component of moral behavior. This is particularly true for Mencius, who
explicitly describes the relationship between internal feelings and external
acdtions. For Mencius, the idea of expression is not simply a superficial
external qualifier added to a fundamentally separate moral action. Rather, the
mode of expression is viewed as the culmination of expressing the emotional
impulse (or sprout) that occurs as a result of the filial relationship.
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